Leveraging zero trust and risk indicators to support continuous vulnerability compliance
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5753/jisa.2026.5922Keywords:
Continuous Compliance, Vulnerability Management, Zero Trust Architecture, Incident Response, Identity Provisioning, Supply Chain, SPIREAbstract
Open source dependencies are the leading source of vulnerabilities in applications and are often exploited in software supply chain attacks. Efforts to assess vulnerabilities are employed during DevSecOps pipelines in order to keep a system compliant with security regimes. However, current strategies for continuous compliance are limited to preventing issues before deployment, and thus do not address changes in dynamic aspects such as newfound vulnerabilities, let alone how to respond to such incidents. In this work, we leverage zero-trust to enable continuous, post-deployment vulnerability compliance assessment, isolating workloads that fail to meet a minimum security posture. This approach balances exploitation prevention with application availability --- a fundamental trade-off for critical use cases. The solution is built on top of SPIRE, a robust open-source identity provider based on workload attestation, and implements a custom plugin that responds to compliance violations driven by dynamic aspects exposed by OWASP's Dependency Track, an open-source tool for monitoring software components and their dependencies for vulnerabilities. To enhance flexibility in the security-availability trade-off, we introduce a grace period mechanism, enabling organizations to defer enforcement of newly identified vulnerabilities based on workload criticality, thus supporting availability for non-critical workloads without compromising long-term security. Finally, we evaluate the performance impact of this approach on a SPIRE environment, showing that the added resource usage reliably remains within the recommended 16 GiB of RAM and 4 vCPUs to run Dependency Track in production. We also show that the plugin adds less than 6 seconds of latency to the attestation process, which is insignificant given its default frequency of twice per hour. Moreover, the results confirm that the approach successfully prevents vulnerability exploitation by prioritizing security, while enabling controlled flexibility in less critical contexts.
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